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ABSTRACT
Some subsidies (such as for fossil fuels and fisheries) adversely affect global public goods (such
as a stable climate and the maintenance of global fish stocks); others affect global price levels
(domestic support for certain agriculture commodities), or have negative consequences for a
trading partner. WTO members have negotiated an agreement on subsidies, but there are severe
limits to that agreement’s ability to exercise discipline, and the prospects of its amendment remain
limited. This article examines whether states can improve discipline through the use of informal
mechanisms and, if so, under what conditions. Informal discipline on subsidies depends on the
existence of fora to discuss definitions, generate information about their incidence, discuss
whether a particular measure fits the definition, and consider whether a remedy exists. This article
takes international organizations seriously as fora for generating “law,” not simply as bodies
exercising power or coercion, and it explores a particular view of law. If codification is not the
only indicator of law, if one accepts that law also emerges in social interaction, then we must
attend to the less formal places where the law of subsidies emerges, and affects state actions. The
analysis of where disciplines might be found is based on a three-level set of comparisons: (i) Within
the WTO, involving horizontal compared to sectoral disciplines, with a focus on committee and
other peer-review processes, rather than the traditional focus on the dispute settlement system;
(ii) the WTO compared to, and in complement with, other international organizations addressing
particular sectors; and (iii) international organizations compared to, and in complement with,
non-governmental organizations. The article provides four case studies involving subsidies: (i)
export credits, (ii) shipbuilding, (iii) fisheries, and (iv) fossil fuels. It assesses variations in number
of actors, the conceptualization of the problem, definitions, obligation, data, and organizations
across these case studies and the impact of such differences on the development of subsidy
disciplines.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Subsidies create transnational externalities, either through advantages provided to certain traders
or through adversely affecting global public goods. Disciplining such government support through
formally binding rules, however, is notoriously difficult, given the role of subsidies in public
1 Gregory Shaffer is Chancellor’s Professor at the University of California, Irvine School of Law; Robert Wolfe is
Professor at Queen’s University School of Policy Studies; Vinhcent Le is a JD student at the University of California,
Irvine School of Law. We are grateful to the co-authors and research assistants who helped with previous work on
which some of this article builds. We wrote an earlier version of this article, entitled “Informal Law’s Discipline of
Subsidies: Variation in Definitions, Obligations, Transparency, and Organizations,” for the International Centre on
Trade and Sustainable and Development (ICTSD); that paper is part of the E15 Initiative “Strengthening the Global
Trade System” on Subsidies, at http://e15initiative.org/themes/subsidies/ (April 2015).
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policy. Can informal rules serve as a complement and alternative? We believe that a focus on
formal codified law is insufficient for understanding how law develops and has effects on social
understandings and practices. We assess whether the prospects and limits of informal legal rules
to create international discipline on the use of government subsidies in areas where formal or
“hard” law is not working well, or does not exist at all.
The first challenge for disciplining subsidies is defining them. Any government
expenditure is a subsidy; even revenue forgone in the form of tax breaks is a subsidy. Nobody
would imagine that all such expenditure, and foregoing of revenue, should be subject to
international obligations. States have worked for decades to agree on a definition of “subsidy” for
trade purposes since subsidies can be a significant source of international conflict. Some subsidies
(such as for fossil fuels and fishing) adversely affect global public goods (such as a stable climate
and the maintenance of global fish stocks); others affect global price levels (domestic support for
certain agriculture commodities), or have negative consequences for another country’s trading
interests. Such definitional questions depend on the development of consensual understanding.
Subsidies have been subject to evolving disciplines in the trading system since the original
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, but we face the paradox that the current
and much more sophisticated version of those disciplines in the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (ASCM) might be both too constraining, and too loose. On the one hand,
the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as interpreted by the Appellate Body might
interfere with legitimate policy measures, such as supporting the development of renewable
energy. 2 On the other hand, most subsidies are not subject to sanction in the dispute settlement
system, including fossil fuel subsidies, perhaps the most pernicious of all; and, despite years of
negotiations, Members have not agreed on disciplines for fisheries subsidies. Our motivation for
the article lies in an assumption that the Doha Round negotiating group on Rules is not likely to
reach consensus on an amendment of the ASCM any time soon, and that adjudication before WTO
panels and the Appellate Body faces severe limits in advancing discipline in this area. The
motivation, therefore is the question: if states cannot get to further hard law in the area of subsidies
in the near future, can they improve discipline through the use of informal mechanisms and, if so,
under what conditions? That is, do less formal mechanisms at the WTO or elsewhere help provide
effective discipline? And if so, where do they, or where might they, work?
We take international organizations seriously as fora for managing the trading system; we
think about what they do as generating “law” in terms of practice, not simply as an exercise of
power or coercion; and we explore a particular view of law. Legal positivists distinguish between
hard and soft law with a binary binding/non-binding dichotomy. 3 Hard law is then defined as
enforceable rules with precise codification and a tough enforcement system. The “legalization” of
the WTO compared to the GATT is therefore said to represent a transition from a ‘soft law’ to a
‘hard law’ system. 4 Hard law is used to refer to “enforceable” rules while soft law, or “nonbinding” law, means indicative standards. Analysts use the term “soft law” to recognize as “law”
things that can be legal in their effects yet involve neither state legislation nor an international
Henok Birhanu Asmelash, 'Energy Subsidies and WTO Dispute Settlement: Why Only Renewable Energy Subsidies
Are Challenged', 18(2) Journal of International Economic Law 261 (2015), at 274-778.
3 Gregory C. Shaffer and Mark A. Pollack, 'Hard Vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in
International Governance', 94 Minnesota Law Review 706 (2010), at 712-17.
4 Kenneth W Abbott and Duncan Snidal, 'Hard and Soft Law in International Governance', 54(3) International
Organization 421 (2000), at 436, 441.
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treaty. Some scholars rather use the term “informal” with respect to law to capture three distinct
but often combined features: the involvement of (i) non-traditional actors (not just states, but also
regulators, public agencies, central banks, expert groups, cities, business and NGOs), (ii) nontraditional processes (not treaty-making in formal international organizations [IOs] like the WTO
but in networks, arrangements or groups), and (3) non-traditional outputs (not treaties, but
standards, guidelines, principles or arrangements). 5
Constructivist and new governance theorists go further, arguing that while commitments
may vary in their degree of formal codification and their justiciability, neither explicitness nor
courts are necessarily indicators of “law” if actors recognize a provision as legal and act
accordingly. 6 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), for
example, has no formal dispute settlement system, yet signatories act “as if” certain obligations
are binding, such as, for example, the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits
discussed in Part II.1. If codification is not the only indicator of law, if one accepts that law
emerges in social interaction and practice, 7 then we ought to attend to all the places where the law
of subsidies emerges and disciplines state actions.
Global governance can be viewed as operating through different mechanisms, such as
coercion, reciprocity, learning, and socialization. Informal law, although often viewed as working
through the latter two mechanisms, can work through all four. It can lead to social sanctions (such
as consumer boycotts), or affect financing (such as from the International Monetary Fund [IMF]
or World Bank), and thus work through coercion. It can work through reciprocity such as in WTO
and OECD peer-review systems based on reciprocal commitments involving reporting,
monitoring, and evaluation. It can lead to policy learning through information sharing and
deliberation. And it can lead to social emulation and model mongering affecting practice.
Law is most likely to play an effective role where its subjects reach a consensus on
diagnosing the problem that law is designed to address. Informal discipline on subsidies depends
on the existence of fora to discuss and clarify definitions, generate information about their
incidence, discuss whether a particular measure fits the definition, and consider whether a remedy
exists. In the trading system, the WTO provides a forum, but it is not alone, since so do the Group
of Twenty (G-20), the OECD, the IMF, and informal networks organized by non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and other stakeholders. The success of the processes will depend on
generating trustworthy data, identifying the relevant actors, and providing a forum for bringing
them together. The monitoring of whatever rules emerge requires ongoing deliberation to ensure
convergence of normative understandings as applied to particular contexts, and concordance
between international norms and national and local practice. Only then will normative settlement
5 Joost Pauwelyn, 'Rule-Based Trade 2.0? The Rise of Informal Rules and International Standards and How They May
Outcompete WTO Treaties', 17(4) Journal of International Economic Law 739 (2014), at 742. See also Gregory
Shaffer and Mark A. Pollack, ‘The Interaction of Formal and Informal Lawmaking’, in Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses
Wessel and Jan Wouters (eds), Informal International Lawmaking (2012) 241-270 (addressing guidelines, standards,
declarations, and informal monitoring and peer-review processes).
6 Cf. Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, 2nd ed. (1969); Roderick A. Macdonald, 'Here, There…and Everywhere:
Theorizing the Legal Pluralism of Jacques Vanderlinden', Mélanges Jacques Vanderlinen (2005); Robert Wolfe, 'See
You in Geneva? Legal (Mis)Representations of the Trading System', 11(3) European Journal of International Relations
339 (2005); Charles Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin (eds), Experimentalist Governance in the European Union (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2010).
7 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account (2010)
xviii, 411; Friedrich Kratochwil, The Status of Law in World Society: Meditations on the Role and Rule of Law, Vol.
129 (2014) 101ff.
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of the meaning of the rules emerge. 8 When the legal order aligns with the understanding of the
problem, and such normative settlement occurs across levels of social organization, one can refer
to the creation of a transnational legal order in which norms and practices at the transnational,
national, and local levels concord. 9
Information, and discussion of that information, in some sort of body provide an
opportunity to learn from the experience of other countries and to consider whether government
support serves a legitimate policy objective, or whether it is an attempt to manipulate the terms of
trade at the expense of firms in other countries. The notion that transparency matters is based on
the idea that sunshine can discipline the actions of states. 10 The canonical idea, going back to Louis
Brandeis, that sunshine is the best disinfectant, assumes that agents whose actions are exposed will
hew more closely to shared understandings of the common good. 11 If not, then other agents
provided with information can exercise appropriate discipline. Sunshine in itself enables but does
not cause change. In this view of agency, sunlight can contribute more to social order than
coercion. Sunlight plays this role in the trading system by reducing information asymmetries. That
is, individual governments may know what they are doing (though not what all parts or level of
government are doing!), but firms, citizens, and trading partners do not know. Information
understood in this way is a public good, and one that is likely to be underprovided. Even if the
subsidy is legitimate, the public has a right to know, and other governments both need to be assured
that the measure is legitimate, and they can learn from the policy experience of others.
Organizations have comparative advantages, and issue areas vary in their characteristics,
so that some organizations are relatively better suited for some issue areas than others. Actors’
choice among international organizations to discipline particular subsidies can reflect variation in
their characterization of what makes a subsidy an international issue (such as whether it affects
trading partners or undermines global public goods), and the number of parties affected by the
particular subsidy (such as all countries or only a subset of countries in which a particular economic
sector is established, such as shipbuilding or commercial jet aircraft). This article begins by
addressing subsidies viewed primarily as trade concerns, and shows that parties do not have to do
everything at the WTO. It then addresses subsidies viewed primarily as public goods concerns,
such as fisheries and fossil fuel subsidies.
We assess variation in subsidy disciplines in two ways, the first involving alternative fora
within the WTO and other international organizations to address them; and the second involving
four dimensions of variation within each of these institutional settings: definition of the subsidy;
consensus over obligation; trustworthiness of data; and organizational characteristics.
First, we consider variation:
1. Within the WTO, involving the choice between cross-cutting (horizontal) compared to
sectoral disciplines, with a focus on committee and other peer-review processes, rather than
the traditional legal focus on the dispute settlement system; and
2. The WTO compared to, and in complement with, other international organizations
addressing particular sectors, notably the OECD, including variation within the OECD.
8 See Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer, ‘Transnational Legal Orders’, in Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer
(eds), Transnational Legal Orders (2015) 3-75, at 38-41 (on the issue of normative settlement).
9 Ibid.
10 See Petros C. Mavroidis and Robert Wolfe, 'From Sunshine to a Common Agent: The Evolving Understanding of
Transparency in the WTO', 21(2) Brown Journal of World Affairs 174 (2015).
11 Louis D. Brandeis, Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It (New York: F.A. Stokes, 1914), Chapter V.
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Second, we consider variation across our four case studies, on four dimensions:
1. Definition of subsidies, which can be a proxy for the degree of consensual understanding
in a sector.
2. Obligations, which are necessarily subsequent to a definition of subsidy within a sector.
3. Data, which vary by source, quality, and the amount of transparency provided to other
governments and the public.
4. Organizational characteristics, which vary in terms of opportunities for learning,
surveillance, and dispute settlement.
Our expectation is that definitional clarity (dimension 1) allows for stronger discipline
(dimension 2) because everyone understands the obligations. More trustworthy data (dimension 3)
means more sunshine, which allows trading partners and stakeholders to apply pressure for reform.
And such pressure is more readily applied in organizations with a strong institutional structure
(dimension 4) that provides for sustained interaction to clarify definitions and obligations, and to
ensure monitoring, facilitate learning and determine remedies. We also expect disciplines focused
on a smaller number of affected actors to be easier to reach than those involving large numbers,
such as the beneficiaries of fossil fuel subsidies.
Part II discusses the contribution and limits of transparency and surveillance to the
horizontal discipline of subsidies in the WTO. Part III presents four sectoral case studies involving
organizations other than the WTO: the OECD export credit arrangement; OECD shipbuilding
initiatives; various initiatives on fisheries subsidies; and various ones on fossil fuel subsidies. The
article concludes by asking: What works? Are informal disciplines possible?
II.

Horizontal Subsidies Discipline in the WTO

The dispute settlement system is thought to be the jewel in the WTO crown, the means of enforcing
the rules. But here is the puzzle — while subsidies have been the subject of 103 complaints in the
WTO, constituting 21 percent of all disputes, and 25 percent of the cases resulting in a Panel or
Appellate Body decision, the number of cases filed is minute relative to the volume of state aids
and world trade. Disputes are the small tip of a large pyramid of conflict management mechanisms
in the WTO. 12 A focus on disputes as enforcement of hard law obscures the other, perhaps more
important though less formal, aspects of the WTO contribution to subsidies discipline.
In the WTO, transparency and monitoring provisions are primarily focused on helping to
ensure that existing commitments are met. They can, in theory, however, also lead to new
knowledge that can lead to changes in the rules, their interpretation, and practices, including by
giving rise to new understandings among policymakers. Three actions are especially important for
the operation of transparency in the WTO regarding subsidies—how the other Members of the
WTO are notified of the new policy action; how a notification is discussed in Geneva; and whether
12 Robert Wolfe, 'Letting the Sun Shine in at the WTO: How Transparency Brings the Trading System to Life', World
Trade Organization (WTO) (2013), at 24, available at https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201303_e.pdf
(visited 10 September 2015); see Henrik Horn, Petros C. Mavroidis, and Erik N. Wijkstrom, 'In the Shadow of the
DSU: Addressing Specific Trade Concerns in the WTO SPS and TBT Committees', 47(4) Journal of World Trade 729
(2013) (discussing informal trade conflict resolution in WTO committees).
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the results of the Geneva process are published in a way that allows citizens to hold their
government accountable for its use of public money.
In the WTO Glossary, a “notification” is defined as “a transparency obligation requiring
member governments to report trade measures to the relevant WTO body if the measures might
have an effect on other Members.” 13 In previous work, Collins-Williams and Wolfe showed how
the record of industrial subsidies notification under the ASCM was poor. 14 It still is. As shown in
Table 1, more than half of the Members are still not notifying their subsidies. Some Members have
not submitted a notification for many years, and Members question the comprehensiveness of the
notifications that have been submitted. While some notifications run to hundreds of pages, others
are very brief.
Table 1: Status of Subsidies Notifications 15
2007
2009 2011
Members that notified subsidies
46%
46% 45%
Members that made a “nil” notification
8%
14% 14%
Sub-total notifying Members
54%
60% 59%
46%
40% 41%
Members that did not make any notification

2013
37%
11%
48%
52%

In the face of continued weak notification, the chair of the Committee on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM Committee) began reading out the names of Members who were
late. 16 When that did not improve the rate of notification, he invited all of the Members who were
late to explain the delay to the committee. 17 Among the most important players invited to offer
such explanations at the April 2012 meeting were China, the European Union (EU) (on behalf of
Austria and Greece), India, Indonesia, Nigeria, South Africa, and Thailand. 18 The excuses offered
included technical and capacity constraints, and coordination difficulties. 19 In April 2013, the SCM
chair listed the 71 Members that had not made 2011 notifications, including four of the top 30
merchandise exporters — China, Indonesia, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates. 20
Why do Members not notify subsidies? Four reasons can be advanced. The first is
bureaucratic incapacity, which may be the case for many developing countries whose trade
ministries are understaffed and lack resources. Second, Members might worry about providing
adverse information for a potential legal dispute, perhaps about a measure they suspect might be
illegal. By notifying, they provide information that a trading partner might not have and they admit
WTO, ‘Glossary’, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/glossary_e/glossary_e.htm (visited 10 September 2015).
See Terry Collins-Williams and Robert Wolfe, 'Transparency as a Trade Policy Tool: The WTO’s Cloudy
Windows', 9(4) World Trade Review 551 (2010), at 564-65.
15 WTO, 'Overview of Developments in the International Trading Environment: Annual Report by the DirectorGeneral', Trade Policy Review Body, WT/TPR/OV/16, 31 January 2014,Table 21.
16 WTO, ‘Minutes of the Regular Meeting Held on 26-27 October 2011’, Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, G/SCM/M/79, 2 February 2012, para. 143-44.
17 Ibid. para. 147
18 Ibid, para. 145.
19 Ibid, para. 146, 157, 159, 161.
20 WTO, 'Notification Requirements Under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures’, Committee
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, G/SCM/W/546/Rev.4, 16 April 2013, at 14; WTO, 'Minutes of the Regular
Meeting Held on 22 April 2013’, Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, G/SCM/M/85, 5 August
2013, para. 26.
13
14
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that the measures might be actionable. Third, Members’ trade authorities find it easier to notify
actions taken by themselves (like the number of new dumping investigations commenced by the
commerce department) than data on subsidies offered by other ministries, or other levels of
government. The fourth reason, and perhaps most important, is ambiguity about what to notify.
The ASCM has no preamble stating the objects and purposes of the agreement that could provide
contextual guidance for interpretation. Some observe that the ASCM’s very vagueness allowed it
to be concluded in the first place, so that, in part, it constitutes the recording of a dis-agreement.
The definition of a subsidy determines what must be notified. The first part of the
definition, in Article 1.1 of the ASCM, requires a financial contribution or price or income support
provided by the government. The second part, in Article 1.2, requires that a benefit be conferred
to the recipient, which entails an exercise of comparison between a situation where a recipient
receives the financial contribution and one where it does not. The ASCM classified subsidies as
prohibited, actionable, or non-actionable. 21 Two categories of subsidies, import substitution and
export subsidies, are prohibited. 22 For a Member to take action against a “harmful” subsidy of
another Member that is actionable, it has to be specific and the adverse effects have to be
demonstrated. 23
The SCM committee’s notification questionnaire, therefore, requires Members to notify
“a) all specific subsidies … and b) all other subsidies, which operate directly or indirectly to
increase exports” (emphasis added). 24 The legal text and the jurisprudence fail, however, to clarify
the conditions under which subsidies are specific, perhaps because the concept lacks solid
economic justification. 25 What also makes determining notification obligations difficult is that part
of the questionnaire that requests “Statistical data permitting an assessment of the trade effects of
the subsidy” (emphasis added). 26 Whether a subsidy has trade effects requires a judgment by the
notifier, one that does not lend itself to a quick assessment by government officials. Moreover,
such data may be perceived as a confession inviting a dispute, and thus, not surprisingly, are rarely
provided. 27 Given the different, incomplete, and sometimes unclear notifications that Members
have submitted to the WTO, it seems that they are confused about what the definition covers and,
as a consequence, are unclear on which subsidies they ought to notify. Rubini thus concludes that
all subsidies should be notified to the WTO, allowing questions to be asked in the committee.28
But given that the Appellate Body has determined that understandings reached in the committee
can have the status of “subsequent agreement” in the sense of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties and thus be enforceable in dispute settlement, as happened in US-Tuna II, 29
Articles 3, 5 and 8 of the ASCM.
Article 3 of the ASCM.
23 Articles 2, 5, and 6 of the ASCM.
24 WTO, ‘Questionnaire Format for Subsidy Notifications Under Article 25 of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures and Under Article XVI of GATT 1994’(ASCM Questionnaire), Committee on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures, G/SCM/6/Rev.1, 11 November 2003, at 1, para. 1.
25 Luca Rubini, The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid: WTO and EC Law in Comparative Perspective (2009) 35966.
26 ASCM Questionnaire, above n 24, at 3, para. 10.
27 Collins-Williams and Wolfe, above n 14, at 575.
28 Rubini, above n 25.
29 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna
and Tuna Products, WT/DS841/AB/R, adopted 16 May 2012, para. 371; see also Gregory Shaffer, ‘The WTO TunaDolphin II Case: United States — Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna
Products’, 1 American Journal of International Law (2013), at 6.
21
22
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Members might be reluctant to go that far. Such hesitation exemplifies the risk that hard law
dispute settlement impedes consensual decision making through informal, soft law mechanisms.
The committee process ought to be central. As a result of questions and challenges posed
before the SCM Committee, a government may provide more information, change policy, or
pressure other units of government to respond. ASCM article 26 mandates the committee to
examine subsidy notifications on a regular basis. The agreement also contains provisions for
“reverse notification” pursuant to which Members may request information on subsidies that they
think another Member was obliged to notify, 30 and can notify measures that they think a trading
partner should have notified. 31 The United States (US) has submitted extensive reverse
notifications of Chinese and Indian subsidies, 32 but few other Members have the capacity to
generate such analysis of another Member’s policies.
A recent EU proposal in the Doha Round negotiating group on Rules addresses many of
these issues. 33 The proposal suggests that the Secretariat could examine the Semi-Annual reports
in which Members list the programs they have countervailed to establish if those programs have
been notified by the Member granting the subsidy. 34 Where the subsidies have not been notified,
the Secretariat could prepare a notification in the usual format and circulate it as a supplement to
any notification of the Member granting the subsidy. 35 Next, they suggest that notified subsidies
would benefit from a rebuttable presumption of non-actionability or an increase in the standards
for action under the ASCM in order to create an incentive for more notification leading to greater
committee oversight. 36 The EU also suggested improvements to the template for the notification
for fishery subsidies under the ASCM, which includes elements additional to those for other
sectors. 37 Here too the EU proposes that duly notified fisheries subsidies would be presumed to be
non-actionable or at least be more difficult to challenge. 38
Members differ hugely in their ability to ask questions in the committee. Collins-Williams
and Wolfe found that a small number of Members consistently asked questions in the SCM and
Agriculture committees in 2006–07, and were also consistently targets. 39 The nearly 900 questions
asked in the SCM Committee from 2008 to 2012 were asked by only 16 Members, all but two of
whom are G20 countries, but the questions were posed to 58 Members (counting the EU as one). 40
This disparity shows most clearly in the bars on the right of Figure 1 — other developing countries
receive many more questions than they pose.

Article 25.8 of the ASCM
Article 25.10 of the ASCM
32 For example, on fisheries support, see WTO, ‘Subsidies: Request From the United States to China Pursuant to
Article 25.8 of the Agreement’, Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, G/SCM/Q2/CHN/52, 17 April
2015.
33 WTO, ‘Rules Negotiations – Transparency: Communication From the European Union’(Communication from the
EU), Negotiating Group on Rules, TN/RL/W/260, 16 July 2015.
34 Ibid, at 2.
35 Mavroidis and Wolfe see this as the Secretariat acting as the common agent of Members. See Mavroidis and Wolfe,
above n 10, at 5-6.
36 WTO, ‘Communication from the EU’, above n 33, at 2.
37 Ibid, at 3-4.
38 Ibid.
39 See Collins-Williams and Wolfe, above n 14, at 566, 570.
40 The numbers in this section were compiled by Robin Fraser from SCM Committee minutes and other documents.
30
31
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Figure 1: Questions in the SCM Committee (2008-2012)
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Figure 2 shows what these questions concerned. Noteworthy is how seldom Members ask
about trade effects, and how often they ask about eligibility and local content — that is, about
specificity, which would make the subsidies actionable. We have not investigated whether the
questioners were satisfied with the answers, or whether the answers clarified the matter, or
provided the information necessary to launch a new dispute. Informality can be hampered by a
fear that comments made in a committee discussion, or even accepting that the matter was a
legitimate subject for discussion, might form the basis for a ruling in a subsequent dispute.
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Figure 2: Categorization of Questions Asked in 2009-10
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Subsidies are often mentioned in preferential trade agreements (PTAs), but the disciplines
are weak, and PTAs generally do not create either notification requirements for subsidies, or a
body where such notification could be reviewed. PTAs also lack a secretariat able to support a
robust transparency process, which could be a reason PTA partners rarely use their anemic dispute
settlement provisions. Not surprisingly, therefore, PTA partners make good use of the WTO
committee review mechanism. Since 2008, eight of the 16 Members that posed questions in the
SCM Committee posed them to a PTA partner. Only three of the 59 questions asked by Australia
went to its PTA partners, but 46 of 126 questions posed by Canada went to the US, its North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) partner, and the EU and the US asked each other 128
of the 880 questions posed in the committee (98 were questions the US posed of the EU, and 30
were questions the EU posed of the US). In other words, PTAs formally often include both
formally binding rules and formal dispute settlement to enforce them. Yet these hard law
mechanisms may be much less effective in disciplining subsidies than informal law mechanisms
of notification and peer review.
A. Trade Policy Review Mechanism
A helpful alternative forum within the WTO to generate more information about subsidies with an
opportunity for discussion is the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB). The central objective of the
TPRB is “to contribute to ... the smoother functioning of the multilateral trading system, by
achieving greater transparency in, and understanding of, the trade policies and practices of
Members.” 41 The TPRB generates three sorts of reports — (i) the periodic Trade Policy Review
41

Annex 3(A)(i) of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
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(TPR) of each Member; (ii) the annual review of the state of the trading system; and (iii) the
monitoring reports on measures taken in response to the financial crisis. 42 In these reports to the
TPRB, issued on the authority of the Director-General (and not of Members), the Secretariat
sometimes warns or expresses concerns on the basis of its analysis, but never criticizes Members
explicitly, and never comments on their rights and obligations under the WTO agreements.
Discussion in the TPRB therefore does not imply either that a measure is or is not actionable.
The core of each TPR report is based on notifications from Members, but each report builds
from a far wider range of information. The Secretariat collects data from official sources
(questionnaires to Member under review) and non-official sources, including from other
international organizations, media reports, and NGOs. 43 To ensure accuracy, the Secretariat seeks
verification of the data from non-official sources when discussing the draft of its report with the
Member. 44 Given the difficulties devising disciplines regarding subsidies of service providers
under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and thus the lack of notification
obligations under it, we only know about services subsidies because of those that surface in TPR
reports. 45
Subsidies clearly increased after the 2008 financial crisis and they have been a particular
concern in the crisis-monitoring exercise of the TPRB because of their effects on the trading
system, for good as well as ill. Annex 4, added to the 2012 WTO annual monitoring report, 46 is a
valiant attempt to address subsidies (called “General Economic Stimulus Measures”), although the
Secretariat observed that assessment is inevitably biased because of the paucity of information
provided by Members, sometimes because they claim in response to the Director-General’s
questionnaire that the relevant supports are not “new measures” and hence not covered by the
process. 47 While the reports are one of the few sources of systematically collected subsidies data,
they are not strictly comparable, the Secretariat observes, because absence or presence of data in
the report on any one country may be an artifact of information problems, rather than an indication
that the Member does or does not maintain such subsidies. 48 TPR reports on individual Members
face the same difficulty, showing considerable variation in coverage of the major economies. A
recent report on the EU had seven pages on subsidies and government assistance, 49 and that on the
42 WTO,’Overview of Developments in the International Trading Environment’ (Overview of Developments), Trade
Policy Review Body, WT/TPR/OV/14, 21 November 2011, para. 178ff. To access country specific Trade Policy
Reviews, see WTO, ‘Trade Policy Reviews: The Reviews’, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm
(visited 11 September 2015).
43 See Julien Chaisse and Mitsuo Matsushita, 'Maintaining the WTO's Supremacy in the International Trade Order: A
Proposal to Refine and Revise the Role of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism', 16(1) Journal of International
Economic Law 9 (2013), at 21; Arunabha Ghosh, ‘Strengthening WTO Surveillance: Making Transparency Work for
Developing Countries’, in Carolyn Deere Birkbeck (ed), Making Global Trade Governance Work for Development
(Cambridge University Press, 2011) 394-441, at 431.
44 See WTO, ‘Overview of Developments’, above n 42, para. 180.
45 See WTO, 'Subsidies for Services Sectors Information Contained in WTO Trade Policy Reviews’, Working Party
on GATS Rules, S/WPGR/W/25/Add.6, 18 March 2013.
46WTO, (2012) 'Overview of Developments in the International Trading Environment: Annual Report by the DirectorGeneral,' World Trade Organization, WT/TPR/OV/15, 29 November 2012. WTO, ‘Report to the TPRB from the
Director-General on Trade-Related Developments’, Trade Policy Review Body, WT/TPR/OV/W/6, 28 June 2012.
47 Ibid, para. 112.
48 Ibid, para. 118.
49 WTO, ‘Trade Policy Review Report by the Secretariat: The European Union’, Trade Policy Review Body,
WT/TPR/S/317, 18 May 2015, at 64-72.
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US had two pages under “Measures Affecting Investment and Trade.” 50 The Japan report had five
paragraphs on “Subsidies and support,” 51 the Korea report only briefly touched on export
subsidies. 52 The TPR for China has more than three pages about “Subsidies and other government
assistance,” but notes that “very few details are available on China’s subsidies and other
government assistance, particularly at the sub-central level, on their type and size, the financial
outlays involved, and the objectives of the programmes and their results.” 53 In contrast, coverage
on subsidies issues was not obvious in the reports on Brazil, Mexico, and Indonesia, though the
latter in particular is known to be a heavy provider of fossil fuel subsidies. 54
The coverage of subsidies in TPR reports may reflect the extent to which the Secretariat
sees the issue as a challenge for the country, but it could also be a reflection of the reluctance of
Members to provide information. We contend that where notification is weak, the Secretariat
should act as the “common agent” of all participants in the trading system, actively seeking
information. 55 For example, the TPR of Malaysia in 2014 used public sources to go well beyond
the country’s 2009 and 2011 SCM notification, and the US 2012 reverse notification, to
demonstrate that the country was one of the most heavily subsidized in its region. 56
In sum, informal mechanisms can have bite, but they depend on social interaction. When
drafting the ASCM, negotiators worried that some legitimate government measures might meet
the test of being a subsidy, but should not face sanction in the dispute settlement system, and so
they created a category of “non-actionable” subsidies in Article 8. That provision lapsed after five
years, and will likely not be recreated. Yet that provision can still reflect a normative understanding
among Members even though it is not formally in effect. For example, Article 8 covered
government support for research. Such support is ubiquitous, which might lead one to think that it
risks being subject to countervail. And yet in all the years since Article 8 lapsed, government
support for research came up only a handful of times in questions in the SCM Committee, and
seems to be mentioned in formal disputes only in the infamous Boeing-Airbus saga. We suggest
that this tacit acceptance of support for research is a case of Members acting “as if” the subsidies
are covered by the now lapsed provisions of Article 8. That is, the “non-actionable” category lives
on implicitly in Members’ understanding of appropriate policy. This phenomenon reflects what
could be called Members’ social understanding of WTO law diffused throughout the WTO
community. 57 It can be argued, therefore, that the interactional opportunities for the development
and affirmation of a shared understanding of what fidelity to WTO obligations entails allows actors
(or at least, active participants who represent a subset of the membership) to know what the WTO
law is without formal amendment of the treaty or an Appellate Body decision.

WTO, ‘Trade Policy Review: Report by the Secretariat - United States’, Trade Policy Review Body,
WT/TPR/S/307, 11 November 2014, at 80-81.
51 WTO, “Trade Policy Review: Report by the Secretariat - Japan’, Trade Policy Review Body, WT/TPR/S/310, 19
January 2015, at 52-53
52 WTO, ‘Trade Policy Review: Report by the Secretariat - Korea’, Trade Policy Review Body, WT/TPR/S/268, 15
August 2012, at 81.
53 WTO, 'Trade Policy Review: Report by the Secretariat - China’, Trade Policy Review Body, WT/TPR/S/264/Rev.1,
20 July 2012, at 68-72.
54 See TPR reports for Brazil (WT/TPR/S/283), Mexico (WT/TPR/S/279) and Indonesia (WT/TPR/S/278).
55 See Mavroidis and Wolfe, above n 10.
56 WTO, 'Trade Policy Review: Report by the Secretariat - Malaysia', Trade Policy Review Body, WT/TPR/S/292, 27
January 2014, at 9, para. 16, 59, 66-67 (looking at speeches, news articles, OECD reports, banking data, and other
sources, to find the extent of Malaysia’s subsidies).
57 Fuller, above n 6, at 106, Brunnée and Toope, above n 7, at 34, 8, 64, 101.
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Some WTO committees have a policy-oriented discussion on the margins of the regular
committee meetings through which normative understandings of a rule’s interpretation and
appropriate implementation can be developed. Examples include discussions in the Committee on
Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures, the Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT),
and the Committee on Trade and the Environment (CTE). These committees tend to bring together
technocratic officials specialized in particular domains. But such policy discussions do not occur
in connection with the SCM Committee. Why not? One reason appears to be constraints on WTO
Secretariat resources. But it could also be that governments do not want to discuss the issues,
perhaps for political reasons, or out of concerns about the balance of rights and obligations. One
weakness of the WTO, ironically, could therefor be its codification of “binding” obligations in a
treaty that includes formalized dispute settlement that traders perceive as “hard” law. The result is
that amendments, revisions, and new obligations have become difficult, if not impossible, to
negotiate.
The organization of specific fora that bring together discrete networks of regulatory
officials also appears to matter, as exemplified by WTO Members’ distinct handling of agricultural
subsidies. Our discussion so far has focused on the procedural aspects of informal WTO disciplines
on all non-agricultural subsidies. The distinction between agricultural and non-agricultural
subsidies is significant. Export subsidies under GATT 1947 were illegitimate only for “nonprimary” products. 58 Contracting Parties were only enjoined to “avoid” applying export subsidies
to primary products, and, if export subsidies were applied, they should not result in a Contracting
Party having “more than an equitable share of world export trade in that product.” 59 At the 1982
GATT ministerial, participants agreed to examine all subsidies affecting agriculture separately,
especially export subsidies, and the 1986 Punta del Este declaration maintained that negotiations
should aim at “improving the competitive environment by increasing discipline on the use of all
direct and indirect subsidies and other measures affecting directly or indirectly agricultural trade,
including the phased reduction of their negative effects and dealing with their causes.” 60 The
eventual 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) hived off agriculture subsidies
from the ASCM. 61 Efforts to develop further disciplines on agricultural subsidies, especially
domestic support, but also on export credits in agriculture after a failure at the OECD, 62 remain a
central element of the Doha Round, to be handled apart from industrial subsidies.
The implication of the example of agricultural subsidies is that the general or “horizontal”
disciplines of the ASCM may not be suitable for all sectors; and experience in other areas suggests
that the WTO itself may not be the appropriate forum for all sectors. While the 1979 plurilateral
Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft mentions subsidies, 63 it has never been invoked in a GATT
or WTO complaint. The 1992 EC-US bilateral Agreement on Trade in Large Civil Aircraft had

Article XVI(3) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1947).
Ibid.
60 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, GATT Doc. No. MIN.DEC, 20 September 1986, at 6.
61 Robert Wolfe, 'Endogenous Learning and Consensual Understanding in Multilateral Negotiations: Arguing and
Bargaining in the WTO', Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy and Competitiveness Research Network CATRPN
Working Paper No. 2010-02 (2010), at 22.
62 See Mike Roberts, ‘OECD and Agricultural Credits: A Singular Failure’, in Smart Rules for Fair Trade: 50 years
of Export Credits (OECD Publishing, 2011) 107-11 (finding that the failure to obtain consensus on agricultural export
credits was an exception to the usual success of the OECD export credit family).
63 Article 6.1 of the Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft, done at Geneva, 12 April 1979, OJ L71, 17/03/1980, at 58.
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strong language on transparency, 64 but weak institutional provisions. The agreement was
unilaterally terminated by the US in 2004 when it filed its WTO complaint about Airbus subsidies,
but the US cited the subsidies commitments of the bilateral agreement in its WTO complaints. The
long-running Canada-US softwood lumber conflict, resulting in numerous WTO and NAFTA
disputes, is now subject to a bilateral accord. 65 The special characteristics of the steel and
shipbuilding industries led to initiatives for distinct disciplines at the OECD, as did export credits,
itself containing both general provisions and sectoral annexes. And, of course, discussion on
fisheries subsidies and fossil fuel subsidies occurs in many places in addition to, or instead of, the
WTO. In the next section we address the role and operation of other fora for such sectoral
disciplines.
III.

SECTORAL CASE STUDIES

The law of subsidies should be viewed on a continuum. Most generally, collective understandings
on the definition of subsidies and mutual obligations may eventually be codified or even
adjudicated in the WTO, but those understandings begin to emerge elsewhere. More particularly,
other organizations may hold data on the incidence of subsidies that is more comprehensive than
that held in the WTO, and these other organizations may be better placed to develop disciplines
separately or as a complement to those in the WTO. The information and disciplines generated can
feed into and inform the WTO peer-review and dispute settlement processes. And such WTO
mechanisms may play no, or only a minor, role in disciplining particular types of subsidies
compared to such other organizations.
We have selected four sectoral cases for examination that represent variation in (i) the
conceptualization of the subsidy as a trade or public goods problem; (ii) the number of countries
affected; (iii) the definition of a the sectoral subsidy; (iv) the extent of formal obligation; (v) the
extent of data and transparent reporting and peer review; and (vi) the organizations addressing the
issue. Two case studies (concerning fisheries and fossil fuel subsidies) entail subsidies defined as
a public goods problem involving a large number of countries. The other two case studies
(concerning export credits and shipbuilding subsidies) entail subsidies defined as a trade problem
involving a relatively smaller number of countries. The OECD disciplines in these domains differ
in their degree of formal obligation, with export credits being governed by formally non-binding
rules, while shipbuilding initiatives aimed (but failed) to create formally binding rules backed by
dispute settlement. We first consider the OECD’s work on export credits and shipbuilding
subsidies.
A. OECD’s Work on Export Credits
An export credit is a loan issued by a government or private bank that generally allows purchasers
to defer payment for industrial products such as capital goods or commercial aircraft, or for
services, notably engineering services. Foreign buyers may base their purchasing decision on
whether an exporter can provide acceptable financing terms. This financing may be too costly or
simply unavailable from commercial lenders due to incomplete information and the risk of default.
64 Article 8 of the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the United States
of America concerning the application of the GATT Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft on trade in large civil
aircraft, done at Brussels and Washington, 17 July 1992, OJ L301, 17/10/1992, at 33-34.
65 Softwood Lumber Agreement, U.S.-Canada, 29 May 1996, 35 I.L.M 1195 (1996).
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Export credit agencies (ECAs) are public or semi-public banks that fill these gaps in private export
financing by providing loans, insurance, and guarantees at below-market rates. ECAs receive
government support in the form of access to treasury funds and public capital markets — subsidies,
in other words. These export finance subsidies create trade distortions since buyers make
purchasing decisions on the basis of the export credit terms rather than the price and quality of the
goods.
International cooperation on export credit policy began in 1934 with the formation of the
Berne Union, a multilateral group of private and state ECAs that sought to reduce commercial risk
through the exchange of information on foreign borrowers. 66 In the 1970s, facing large trade
deficits due to rising oil prices, nations increasingly subsidized export credits to boost exports,
resulting in a sharp increase in ECA lending. Talks among OECD trade ministers resulted in the
1978 Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits (Arrangement). Since 1978, the
Participants to the Arrangement (Participants) have significantly developed the Arrangement to
adapt to changing circumstances and to close loopholes. 67 It has helped build a shared social
understanding of appropriate export credit practices that have shaped state action.
The Arrangement formally lies outside of the OECD, but is serviced by the OECD
secretariat. The Working Party on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees (ECG), created in 1963,
operates as an official OECD committee. Both the Arrangement and the ECG define export credits
as a trade problem. The ECG brings together export credit and trade and treasury officials from all
OECD members (other than Chile and Iceland) to review the operation of both member and nonmember export credit systems. In addition, partly in response to pressure from NGOs, the ECG
has developed principles of good governance on issues such as anti-bribery measures, and
environmental and social due diligence. 68
The Arrangement is based on consensus, and not on formally international binding law.69
Its Participants include a majority of the states that provide officially supported export finance—
Australia, Canada, the EU (with 20 EU members having ECAs), Japan, Korea, New Zealand,
Norway, Switzerland, and the US. 70 The European Commission participates alone in the
Arrangement, although EU member states participate directly in the ECG. The Participants are not
bound by the OECD rules of procedure, allowing for the participation of non-OECD members,
thus creating a more informal and inclusive negotiation process. 71 Many countries observe the
process in some way. Israel and Turkey, for example, are observers at Participants’ meetings, and
Brazil is a full Participant in the Arrangement’s Sector Understanding on Export Credits for Civil
Aircraft. 72
66 For an overview of the Arrangement’s history, see Andrew M. Moravcsik, 'Disciplining Trade Finance: The OECD
Export Credit Arrangement', 43(1) International Organization 173 (1989), at 178-81 and Francois de Ricolfis, ‘A Long
History in Facing Challenges’ in Smart Rules for Fair Trade: 50 Years of Export Credits (2011) 101-106.
67 See Janet West, ‘Export Credits and the OECD’, in Smart Rules for Fair Trade: 50 Years of Export Credits (Paris:
OECD Publishing, 2011) 19-40, at 24-26, 38-39; Moravcsik above n 66, at 185-86.
68 See Michael H. Wiehan, ‘The OECD and Civil Society in the Fight Against Corruption’, in Smart Rules for Fair
Trade: 50 Years of Export Credits (2011) 120-24; West, above n 67, at 23-24.
69 Janet Koven Levit, 'The Dynamics of International Trade Finance Regulation: The Arrangement on Officially
Supported Export Credit', 45 Harvard International Law Journal 65 (2004), at 101.
70 Article 3 of the Arrangement.
71 Nicola Bonucci, OECD Work on Export Credits: A Legal and Institutional Laboratory', in Smart Rules for Fair
Trade: 50 Years of Export Credits (OECD 2011) 49-55, at 52.
72 OECD, ‘The Participants to the Export Credit Arrangement’, http://www.oecd.org/tad/xcred/participants.htm
(visited 9 September 2015).
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The Arrangement has been effective because of its precision, involving clear,
comprehensive, detailed commitments, and because of its flexibility, adaptability, and ease of
revision to address new circumstances, and to address particular sectors through sector
understandings. 73 In the past decade alone, the Participants negotiated new or updated sector rules
on civil aircraft (2011), nuclear power plants (2009), climate change (2014), and rail projects
(2014). The Arrangement clearly defines the types of government support measures covered, 74 and
the most favorable terms ECAs can offer prospective borrowers. 75 These specific, technical
definitions remove ambiguity, and thus facilitate implementation and monitoring through the
Arrangement’s procedures for information exchange and notification. 76 Repayment terms such as
the minimum interest rate are set by specific, technical formulae that automatically adjust based
on commercial interest rates and other economic indicators. 77 These automatic adjustment
mechanisms allow the Arrangement to maintain its flexibility and relevance despite changing
market conditions.
The Arrangement also provides for transparent derogations from its guidelines, subject to
compliance with clear procedures based on reciprocal notifications and information exchange. 78
These procedures accommodate changing contexts while maintaining trust. Participants must
notify other Participants when they intend to offer financing terms that utilize a permitted
exception or derogates from the Arrangement guidelines. 79 Other Participants then can engage in
face-to-face consultations about the derogations, and they have the ability to match the nonconforming terms and conditions. 80 This notification and match procedure is described as the
“heart” of the Arrangement because it tolerates non-adherence to its substantive rules if
Participants follow the agreed procedures. 81 This process recognizes that derogation is inevitable,
and so it emphasizes information exchange and transparency while providing procedures that
permit matching the derogation to eliminate any competitive advantage. Taken together, these
procedures provide a mechanism where Participants can exchange information and resolve
disagreements before a transaction is finalized, building trust and giving Participants the
confidence that the rules are being followed. 82
Participants also can use an enquiry procedure to ask other Participants about the most
favorable credit terms and conditions they would be willing to support in a given transaction, as
73 There are sector understandings for ships; nuclear power plants; civil aircraft; renewable energy, climate change
mitigation and adaptation, and water projects; and rail infrastructure. These understandings are incorporated into
Annexes I-V of the Arrangement. OECD, ‘Export Credits Sector Understandings’ (7 July 2014),
http://www.oecd.org/tad/xcred/sector-understanding.htm (visited 1 September 2015).
74 Article 5 of the Arrangement (defining the forms of official support covered by the Arrangement).
75 Chapter 2 of the Arrangement.
76 See Levit, above n 69, at 105 (noting the Arrangement’s specificity may enhance compliance by eliminating
ambiguities that disguise non-compliance).
77 Articles 11-12 of the Arrangement (setting maximum repayment terms according to the World Bank’s calculation
of per capita GNI); Articles 19-22 of the Arrangement (establishing minimum interest rates based on government
bond yields).
78 Chapter IV of the Arrangement.
79 Articles 43, 47-50 of the Arrangement.
80 Articles 18, 42, 45-46, 52-53, 57 of the Arrangement.
81 Levit, above n 69, at 109-10.
82 David Drysdale, 'Why the OECD Arrangement Works (Even Though It Is Only Soft Law)', in Andreas Klasen and
Fiona Bannert (eds), The Future of Foreign Trade Support—Setting Global Standards for Export Credit and Political
Risk Insurance (Wiley-Blackwell, 2015).
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well as information regarding third-party countries, institutions, and methods of doing business. 83
ECAs can then use the responses to gather information on how best to structure and evaluate their
own financing packages. This process gives Participants access to “real time transparency” by
providing a procedure and a forum for the timely exchange of confidential transaction data. 84
The status of the Arrangement within the OECD and as a commitment is one of “useful
ambiguity.” 85 As a “Gentleman’s Agreement among the participants” the Arrangement is not an
Act of the OECD, although the OECD Secretariat provides administrative support. The “soft”
nature of the Arrangement works to its advantage by lowering the bar to commitment for the
Participants. Because the instruments are not formally binding, they can more easily be reviewed,
modified, amended, and strengthened. 86
The Arrangement and ECG engage a small, close-knit, technical group of government
officials engaged in export credit practices, the ECAs themselves. Their constant interaction
facilitates adaptations and revisions of the Arrangement over time, as well as its incorporation into
domestic laws and regulations. Officials from ECAs participate in delegations alongside national
trade and treasury representatives. As a result, the instruments are developed and implemented by
practitioners, giving them legal coherence and making them operationally sound. This technocratic
network of ECA officials has developed a sense of camaraderie and collegiality over time. 87
Repeated interaction through the notification and consultation procedures builds trust, since these
procedures magnify the reputational and professional costs of non-compliance. 88
The Arrangement, although formally non-binding, has been implemented in whole or part,
directly or by reference, into the laws and regulations of the EU, US, and other Participants.89
Countries also have adopted rules to implement the sector understandings, including Brazil for
aircraft subsidies. Most importantly, the Arrangement and sector agreements have affected the
understandings of appropriate credit practices in the ECAs themselves. These instruments thus can
be viewed as helping to create a transnational legal order since the law is not limited to the
international plane but includes domestic law and agency regulation and practices. 90 Levit’s
detailed study of ECA financing programs found that Participant compliance with the
Arrangement was “high, sustained, and steady throughout the Arrangement’s life.” 91 To date, only

Articles 55-56 of the Arrangement.
See Drysdale, above n 82.
85 John Ray, ‘The Arrangement from the Inside’, in The Export Credit Arrangement: Achievements and Challenges
1978-1999 (1998), 33-37 at 33; Levit, above n 69, at 116 (finding the agreement’s legal ambiguity played a significant
role in the Arrangement’s initial adoption).
86 See Bonucci, above n 71, at 50-51.
87 See Ray, above n 85, at 35 (finding that the success of the 1989 Helsinki negotiations came from the camaraderie
developed from informal social meetings between the Participants).
88 Levit, above n 69, at 127.
89 The Arrangement’s guidelines are incorporated into EU regulations. See Regulation (EU) No 1233/2011 of the
European Parliament of 16 Nov 2011 on the application of certain guidelines in the field of officially supported export
credits and repealing Council Decisions 2001/76/EC and 2001/77/EC, 2011 OJ (L. 326) 45. The United States,
Australia, Switzerland, New Zealand, and one of Norway’s ECAs (Export Credit Norway), each make explicit
reference to the OECD Arrangement in its respective charter. Canada and Norway’s other ECA (GIEK) make indirect
reference to the Arrangement. Confirmed to authors in emails in 2015 from ECA officials.
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one export credit dispute among the Participants has reached the WTO, and it involved
shipbuilding where the understanding is less precise. 92
Although the Arrangement is limited to only a subset of countries, in 1995, it was
incorporated by reference as a carve out to the illustrative list of prohibited export subsidies in
Annex 1 of the ASCM (as item k). Any WTO member who acts within the framework of the
Arrangement, even without being a formal Participant to it, is deemed to comply with WTO
obligations. In this way, the Arrangement has become a worldwide standard. 93 WTO panels have
addressed the Arrangement in aircraft subsidy disputes, such as between Canada and Brazil, which
in turn has led to revisions of the sector understanding, as well as Brazil’s joining the sector
understanding on civil aircraft.
This multilateralization of the Arrangement without the participation of all affected
countries, however, creates both legitimacy and practical challenges. Brazil, China, Colombia,
India, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Mexico, Russia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Indonesia, Argentina, Ecuador,
Zimbabwe, Singapore, Oman, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Hong Kong, Uzbekistan, and South
Africa are not formal participants in the Arrangement, but have officially supported ECAs. 94 These
non-Participant ECAs have not undertaken commitments under the Arrangement, and they can
provide repayment terms and interest rates that are more competitive than Participants, but they
tend not to because they would be at risk of a complaint in the WTO. The growth of nonArrangement based financing is reducing the Arrangement’s effectiveness. 95 Participants thus are
working to develop new ways to entice non-Participants to abide by the Arrangement’s constraints.
Were membership in the Arrangement to expand significantly, however, the adaptation and
development of the Arrangement by consensus could become more difficult.
The Arrangement demonstrates that formally non-binding rules developed outside the
WTO can effectively discipline subsidies when a relatively small group of trading partners is
affected and the scope of the agreement is circumscribed. The Arrangement uses precise and
comprehensive language that helps ensure that common understanding informs practice.
Automatic adjustment mechanisms enable adaptation to changing economic conditions.
Information exchange and notification procedures build professional trust. By allowing some
leeway on substantive compliance while insisting on transparent procedures and notification
mechanisms, these instruments provide state actors with more autonomy, while preserving
transparency and reducing informational asymmetry. This transparency encourages actors to
conform to the discipline. The development and continual evolution of the Arrangement shows
that, at least in small groups, consensus decision-making is possible to facilitate updating and
compliance with normative commitments. Where the barriers to entry are low for observers and
new members, such mechanisms can ensure inclusiveness so that understandings do not unravel.
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B. OECD Shipbuilding Initiatives
The OECD is also the primary forum for discussion of the trade issues related to steel and
shipbuilding. 96 The OECD Steel Committee and the Working Party on Shipbuilding allow major
producers in these sectors to exchange information and examine conditions and trends in the
market. The demand for ships and steel is cyclical, with increased pressure for government
intervention in these politically powerful sectors during periods of low demand. The OECD’s
technical expertise and experience, combined with a membership that includes many of the major
players in these sectors, made it a natural forum for the development of new subsidy disciplines
for steel and shipbuilding. We focus on the shipbuilding initiatives.
Worldwide shipbuilding capacity has long exceeded demand due to the prevalence of
shipbuilding subsidies. Post-war Japan (and later South Korea and China) provided support to
domestic shipyards as a tool to promote economic growth and development. As European
shipbuilders lost market share to Japanese shipyards in the 1950s, they sought subsidies rather than
close mismanaged and outdated shipyards. Increased state aid in the form of easy credit terms,
new construction subsidies, and buyer incentives caused significant overcapacity in the sector,
severely depressing the price of ships. In response, OECD members created the Council Working
Party on Shipbuilding (WP6) in 1966 to identify and progressively eliminate subsidies and other
measures that distort the shipbuilding market. Spurred by a drop in demand, WP6 members
developed policies to stabilize the shipbuilding industry with the 1972 “General Arrangement for
the Progressive Removal of Obstacles to Normal Competitive Conditions in the Shipbuilding
Industry,” which encouraged members to reduce domestic subsidies and notify support measures.
The 1976 General Guidelines for Government Policies in the Shipbuilding Industry pushed for
shipbuilding capacity reductions and increased transparency. 97 Although these guidelines were
non-binding, domestic shipbuilding policies in Japan and Europe conformed to these informal
commitments. 98 Referencing the General Guidelines, Japan cut shipbuilding capacity by 35%
between 1976-1986. 99 In nearly the same period, the European Community reduced its capacity
by an estimated 48%. 100 Between 1973 and the mid-1980s, shipbuilding capacity was reduced by
50 percent in the OECD area. 101 However, overcapacity and subsidization remained a problem,
partially due to new producers entering the market, prompting calls for a binding agreement on
shipbuilding subsidies. 102
In 1989, the US initiated negotiations for an agreement on shipbuilding subsidies at the
urging of the Shipbuilders Council of America. The agreement was completed and signed in 1994
by countries representing eighty percent of the world’s shipbuilding capacity, but it failed in the
US Senate due to opposition from large domestic shipbuilding interests who objected to certain

96 Fabrizio Pagani, OECD Steel and Shipbuilding Subsidy Negotiations: Text and Legal Analysis (London: Cameron
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terms, which, they believed, favored other parties. 103 It thus did not enter into effect. A second
series of talks at the OECD from 2002 to 2005 was aimed at resurrecting the shipbuilding
agreement and bringing about normal competitive conditions in the industry. 104 The negotiations
resulted in a draft text that would have mirrored the ASCM, and included a dispute resolution
mechanism, a list of prohibited and non-actionable subsidies, and separate disciplines for
developing countries. The talks were suspended in 2005, however, and ultimately terminated in
2010, due to inability to reach a consensus on pricing rules. 105
The WP6 nonetheless continues to provide an informal mechanism to discipline
shipbuilding subsidies. It updates the shipbuilding support database, providing a yearly inventory
of OECD and non-OECD support measures, and it conducts peer reviews of national shipbuilding
industries. 106 It conducts workshops for the exchange of ideas and best practices in the shipbuilding
industry. And WP6 members also developed the sector understanding on export credits in
shipbuilding noted above.
This working party provides the primary international forum for non-state actors, like the
International Chamber of Shipping, to engage with government representatives on shipbuilding
subsidies, although it largely passes under the radar of NGOs. These processes of information
exchange and peer review shape normative understandings of shipbuilding subsidies that create a
form of discipline that is underappreciated because it does not involve formally binding law. But
this informal law that emerges through social interaction in WP6 does have behavioral effects,
reflected, for example, in shipbuilding policies in the EU and Japan in the 1970s.
C. Fisheries Subsidies
Fishing provides both jobs and food security, which makes fisheries subsidies politically and
economically popular in many countries. Yet subsidies that promote capacity building accelerate
the process of fishery depletion, a major global problem. A study of global fisheries estimated that
57.4 percent of fish stocks were fully exploited, and 29.9 percent of those stocks were
overexploited. 107 Many commercially important species are becoming endangered and are
vulnerable to collapse. The challenge of responsibly managing fisheries, especially those on the
high seas, is exacerbated because fisheries are open-access resources.
Estimates indicate that the fisheries sector receives more than US$35 billion in subsidies
each year, with US$20 billion for capacity building. 108 These numbers are only estimates,
however, because notifications of subsidies to the WTO are limited in part because of conceptual
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ambiguity about the classification of such subsidies under WTO rules, 109 and they are
underreported in other organizations. Between 2000 and 2003, the US reported more than US$1
billion in Government Financial Transfers (GFT) to fisheries to the OECD, but notified only
US$79 million to the WTO under its narrower definition of a subsidy. 110 The WTO concluded that
“a common feature of all official data available on fisheries subsidies (looking at OECD, APEC
and WTO data) is that they provide a very limited coverage of fisheries subsidies granted by
countries other than the EU(15), United States, Canada, Norway, Iceland, Australia and New
Zealand.” 111 The weakness of ASCM notification and surveillance reduces the usefulness of data
available in the WTO, undermining attempts to discipline the sector through the WTO. 112
For a generation, states have been looking for better disciplines on fisheries subsidies on
two tracks, one through United Nations (UN) organizations and the other through the WTO, with
both being spurred by NGOs. On one track, the UN, through the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Fish Stocks Agreement, created a legal regime for
sustainable fishery management that included compliance mechanisms but made no explicit
reference to subsidies. 113 In parallel, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) negotiated
a series of non-binding fisheries rules, and one of its International Plans of Action explicitly called
for assessment and elimination of subsidies and other factors that contribute to excessive fishing
capacity. 114 In addition, the FAO worked to clarify and define fisheries subsidies through its
technical guide on identifying, assessing and reporting on fisheries subsidies. 115 The United
Nations Environment Program (UNEP) focused on the trade aspects of fisheries subsidies in
concert with NGOs, such as the WWF to engage experts, international institutions and key officials
and to raise awareness of the anti-competitive impact of fisheries subsidies on developing
countries. 116
The effect of these efforts is mixed. Compliance with the norms developed by these
organizations was limited by the weak, voluntary nature of these agreements, as well as the lack
of effective peer review or enforcement mechanisms to secure compliance. 117 But these soft-law
contributions improved the definitions, data, and international commitment towards fisheries
subsidy reform, and paved the way for discussions regarding a fisheries subsidies discipline within
the WTO. 118 For example, supporters and opponents of fisheries disciplines alike could draw upon
109
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FAO definitions and data to support policy positions. 119 Similarly, developing countries could
point to UNEP country studies to make their case for subsidy reductions in developed countries.
In this way, the FAO and UN surmounted their institutional limitations by playing a supportive
and facilitative role toward the development of subsidy disciplines regarding fisheries within the
ASCM. 120
The second track is within the WTO. 121 The ASCM applies to fisheries subsidies, but only
to the extent that it covers any subsidy, so that it contains no specific rules relating to fish. In the
1986 Punta del Este declaration launching the Uruguay Round, fish was only indirectly mentioned
in connection with the negotiations on natural resource-based products, where the aim was simply
to enhance market access. 122 At the WTO Seattle ministerial meeting in 1999, the fisheries trade
issue was specifically characterized for the first time as involving subsidies that contribute to
overcapacity and overfishing. 123 Many members, however, expressed concerns relating to
intrusions on domestic policy space, the need for development exceptions, and the possibility of
defining a category of acceptable fisheries subsidies. 124 The 2001 Doha Development Agenda, the
mandate for the Doha Round negotiations, expressly linked subsidies and environmental concerns,
but the topic was assigned to the Rules negotiations together with other ASCM issues.125
The Doha Round negotiations on fisheries subsidies have moved even more slowly than
other aspects of the round. In his report after the 2008 breakdown the Chair concluded that unlike
other Rules issues where he provided a draft text, all he could do on fish was provide a road map. 126
Convergence on the issues was difficult because negotiators advanced differing conceptual
premises that may simply mask their view of national interests in light of the structure of their
fisheries industry and the nature of any state support provided. Despite all sorts of opportunities
for informal information sharing and learning in workshops outside the WTO organized by
international organizations such as UNEP, and by NGOs such as WWF and ICSTD, and despite
the evident fingerprints of NGOs in a draft fisheries text,127 the expert consensus on what needs to
be done had not been translated into consensual understanding among negotiators. The
Chairperson observed that “all participants recognize the global crisis of overcapacity and
overfishing,” attributing the negotiation impasse to divergence in understanding of the issue and
the rules that should apply, with wide conceptual gaps on such basic factors as which subsidies
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should and should not be prohibited, the special needs of developing countries, and the criteria for
general exceptions. 128
Why have the negotiations stalled? Negotiators could not build on existing concepts, since
the usual motivation for disciplines in the ASCM is the effects of a measure on trade. Nothing in
the ASCM deals with overcapacity or resource management. Farm subsidies, the source of endless
disputes in the GATT, are covered by the Agreement on Agriculture. Such subsidies may be easier
to discipline because they demonstrably hurt farmers in other countries. Although fisheries
subsidies also have negative economic externalities for the fishing sector in other countries, they
have not formed the major basis of any formal WTO complaint, and only two complaints have had
even a tangential connection to the fish trade. 129
The draft text on fisheries subsidies provides an example of how informal law can emerge
and influence subsidy disciplines. Reaching consensus on the notion that fisheries subsidies
represented a suitable subject for WTO negotiations took years of effort by international
organizations, governments, and NGOs. 130 First was the patient work of the FAO, UNEP, regional
fishery commissions, and the OECD in gathering information on the state of fish stocks and
monitoring the effects of fishery operations. Second was a series of multilateral agreements that
began to build a governance regime for fisheries management. Third was the building of an
unconventional alliance of countries concerned with the impact of fisheries subsidies on efforts to
manage fish stocks sustainably. Fourth was the analytic and campaigning power of civil society
groups like the WWF and the ICTSD. These groups demonstrated the need for reform, reframed
the issue in WTO language, and created pressure for action. But rules negotiators struggled to
reach a consensual understanding on the causal connections between fisheries subsidies, the
trading system, and the environmental impact of overfishing, so the disciplines remain weak.
D. Fossil Fuel Subsidies
Disciplines on fossil fuel subsidies are essential to combat climate change, but difficult for political
reasons because of their popularity in developed and developing countries where consumption
subsidies often are viewed as progressive in providing assistance to the poor and middle classes,
and production subsidies are claimed to be necessary to promote economic growth. Fossil fuel
subsidies are viewed primarily as a public goods issue, rather than as a trade problem adversely
affecting other countries’ producer interests. Just as for fisheries subsidies, current efforts by
NGOs and other international organizations on fossil fuel subsidies can set the stage for
discussions to create disciplines in the future. This case study looks at how international
organizations are addressing the issue of fossil fuel subsidies, particularly in their approach to
definitions, transparency, and obligations. We look at the WTO, OECD, International Energy
Agency (IEA), IMF, G-20, and the UN.
The ability to generate consensus and compromise on international fossil fuel subsidies
begins with the quality of the data available through notification and reporting processes, which,
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in turn, depends on the definition of a “subsidy.” 131 The WTO general subsidy definition covers a
defined list of financial contributions or price or income support provided by a government, and
requires that a benefit be conferred to the recipient and WTO rules further narrow the definition of
those subsidies that Members must notify to “specific” subsidies. 132 Ambiguity as to whether a
measure confers a benefit or is sufficiently specific provides Members with a justification not to
notify it. In contrast, other organizations such as the OECD and IMF use economic rather than
trade-related definitions that can be tailored to the subsidy at issue, 133 with the result that they are
able to gather more data, which both enhances transparency and is useful for analytic purposes.
OECD definitions differ in practice for industrial subsidies, fossil fuel subsidies,
environmentally harmful subsidies, and agriculture “support.” The OECD inventory measures
fossil fuel support (referencing the Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents [PSE-CSE]
framework used in Agriculture) in terms of measures that support or favor fossil fuel use or
production. 134 Although the inventory uses a deliberately broad definition, it does not measure
support provided through risk transfers, concessional loans, or market price support. 135 The OECD
inventory is useful because it provides policy information beyond the amount of the subsidy, such
as information about the type of subsidy and the conditions necessary to receive the subsidy. The
IEA provides complementary data to supplement the OECD inventory because it measures the
difference between the price to consumers and an international reference price (price-gap method),
capturing the market price support that the OECD definition does not address. The IEA definition,
however, would not capture the support measures that do not directly affect the consumer price of
fossil fuels. 136
The IMF defines energy subsidies broadly to include both production and consumption
subsidies. It measures consumption subsidies using a price-gap approach and includes a corrective
tax intended to reflect the negative externalities of fossil fuel production in their “reference”
price. 137 According to this broader definition, IMF estimates of global energy subsidies, not all of
which affect fossil fuels, are much higher. 138
The weakest definition of fossil fuel subsidies is in the ambiguous G-20 commitment to
reduce “inefficient” fossil fuel subsidies that encourage “wasteful” consumption. 139 Given such an
ambiguous definition, countries have greater incentives to avoid notifying fossil fuel subsidies,.
The relationship between the definition used and subsequent transparency is readily apparent when
comparing notifications of fossil fuel support measures between these organizations. Between
2008 and 2013, there were 640 notifications for fossil fuels reported in the OECD inventory,
compared to 64 WTO SCM notifications, and only 35 notified in the G-20. 140
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Turning to existing organizational efforts to discipline fossil fuel subsidies, we find wide
variation in organizational activity. Within the WTO, little attention has been given to the issue.
WTO Members asked only 14 questions about fossil fuel subsidies in the SCM Committee
between 2008 and 2013. 141 The G-20 process, in contrast, has focused on understanding and
comparing each country’s fossil fuel policies and sharing reform experiences. The 2009 G-20
commitment required countries to create and share their implementation plans for the reduction of
fossil fuel subsidies. 142 The data is poor, however, because of the ambiguous definition and
inconsistent voluntary reporting, which reduces transparency and trust that partners are
reciprocally notifying their subsidies and meeting their commitments In other words, good data is
critical to drive discussions of fossil fuel subsidies and the creation of new disciplines.
At the 2012 Los Cabos Summit, G-20 members reported on the implementation of their
commitments. 143 Some countries had made notable progress with their implementation plans, but
the G-20 reiterated the need to improve how fossil fuel subsidies are defined, and to standardize
reporting. 144 In 2013, G-20 finance ministers agreed to undertake a “voluntary peer review process
for fossil fuel subsidies” and later developed a methodology for that process. 145 A 2014 roundtable
by the Friends of Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform 146 noted that the US and China had voluntarily
agreed to undergo peer review under the G-20, while Peru and New Zealand did the same under a
similar Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) framework. 147 Suggestions for improving
transparency in the sector include standardizing the submission process for subsidy information,
requiring justifications for excluding certain subsidies from the G-20 commitment, separating
subsidy reporting from the reform of rules to build transparency, establishing an oversight board,
and setting more definite timelines to ensure G-20 members can meet their commitments.
The UN system has contributed nothing to definitions or data, so far. In the outcome
document for the September 2015 UN Summit, “Transforming our World: The 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development,” goal 12.c calls on members to “rationalize inefficient fossil-fuel
subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption by removing market distortions, in accordance
with national circumstances, including by restructuring taxation and phasing out those harmful
subsidies.” 148 Intensive work is now under way on designing review and follow-up on these new
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sustainable development goals, but fossil fuel subsidies are unlikely to receive much attention.149
Fossil fuel subsidy reform ought to be included as part of any strategy to reduce greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions, but the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has not
prioritized subsidy reform in its agenda. 150 It could be that many countries will include fossil fuel
subsidies reform in their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) submitted for the
2015 Paris Conference of the Parties. We have not conducted an analysis of Section J on
transparency of action and support in the UNFCCC draft negotiating text for Paris, but the
UNFCCC will have an intensive review process that may well cover fossil fuel subsidies in
INDCs. 151
The IMF’s studies and analyses can increase pressure for reform by revealing the harmful
impact of subsidization. Unlike the other organizations involved to date, the IMF has a coercive
tool to reduce fossil fuel subsidies through the financial leverage it can apply, at least against
developing countries and countries in transition. The IMF’s assistance agreement with Ukraine
provides an example. In April 2014, the IMF and Ukraine agreed on a US$17 billion loan, with
disbursements dependent on performance. 152 Part of the deal called for broad reductions in energy
subsidies, which were as high as eight percent of gross domestic product (GDP). 153 Overall, the
IMF mechanism of conditioning aid on the implementation of subsidy reform, along with technical
support, has had mixed success, however. 154 The asymmetry of IMF treatment of large developed
and small developing countries affects the legitimacy of IMF actions, which can lead to developing
country resistance.
In sum, subsidy disciplines on fossil fuels are at best nascent. Nonetheless, they are now
on the global agenda as actors work toward developing social consensus, primarily through
formally non-binding initiatives. These initiatives will be much more effective if meaningful
reporting, transparency, and peer-review mechanisms can be developed within one or more
organizations.
IV.

Conclusion: What Works?

Disciplining government support through formally binding rules is notoriously difficult.
We thus asked: Can informal rules offer a complement and alternative? And if so, what works?
The simple answer is, nothing works really well, but that answer applies to formal as well as
informal rules. At the WTO with its formally binding rules, the dispute settlement system is not
always useful, negotiations on new rules are blocked, and the less formal surveillance mechanisms
are hampered by patchy data and the reluctance of some Members to challenge each other with
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questions. Sectoral (or vertical) discipline of agriculture subsidies, however, does seem stronger
than the horizontal disciplines, a point that helped motivate our turn to other case studies. Thus,
the more complex answer to the question, what works, is a comparative institutional one. 155
Our expectation at the outset was that definitional clarity (dimension 1) allows for stronger
discipline (dimension 2) because everyone understands the obligations. More data means more
sunshine (dimension 3), which allows trading partners and stakeholders to apply pressure for
reform; and such pressure is more readily applied (dimension 4) in organizations with a strong
institutional structure. Informal law can lead to social sanctions (such as consumer boycotts), or
affect financing (such as from the IMF or World Bank), and thus work through coercion. It can
work through reciprocity such as in WTO and OECD peer-review systems based on reciprocal
commitments, reporting, monitoring, and evaluation. It can lead to policy learning through
information sharing and deliberation. And it can lead to social emulation and model mongering
affecting practice. We expected that the success of any process depends on generating trustworthy
data, identifying the relevant actors, and providing a forum for bringing them together.
Certain organizations and mechanisms have comparative advantages over others, whether
as alternatives or as complements. In the case of subsidies, our four case studies demonstrate that
institutional choice varies with the issue area, and that institutional effectiveness depends on the
clarity of definition, consensus over obligation, access and trustworthiness of information, and
institutional monitoring structure. These factors affect participation, decision making, and
organizational practice, which, in turn, affect outcomes.
The OECD-based export credit Arrangement shows how a formally non-binding
mechanism can give rise to a transnational legal order that permeates national law and practices.
It created detailed rules that were formally non-binding, but were defined and clarified by
consensus decision making over time, combined with notification and peer review mechanisms to
ensure compliance. These mechanisms gave rise to normative settlement across the governmental
and quasi-governmental bodies that administer export credits in OECD countries. Despite the
Arrangement’s considerable success, however, it now faces new challenge of whether its virtues
(limited membership and flexible procedures) can survive the necessary expansion to include large
emerging countries that traditionally have not been part of the OECD club but increasingly use
export credits to subsidize exports.
The OECD’s initiatives on shipbuilding subsidies, in contrast, focused on developing
formally binding law backed by dispute settlement. From the conventional perspective of lawyers,
such hard law should give rise to broader compliance with agreed norms. The focus on hard law
backed by dispute settlement, however, made reaching agreement much more difficult. With its
smaller membership (compared to the WTO’s almost global coverage), and its ability to include
important, non-OECD shipbuilding countries, insiders viewed the WP6 as representing a “feasible,
faster and leaner alternative to WTO negotiations.” 156 Because the issues were focused on a
particular sector and because membership was small in light of the few countries producing large
ships, many expected that disciplines — whether formal (through a binding agreement) or informal
(through formally non-binding undertakings) — should be easier to develop. This narrow focus on
only one sector, as opposed to the WTO’s broad scope, nonetheless, had a disadvantage, at least
for negotiating formally binding rules backed by formal dispute settlement, since it reduced the
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possibility for “package deals” that involve more than one industry. As a result, a group of
powerful domestic constituencies, in the U.S. in particular, was able to derail the negotiations.
The linkage of the trade effects of fisheries subsidies to the broader concern of sustainable
fishing practices activated a broad array of actors that included NGOs. This decades-long,
inclusive process made the development of disciplines more likely by generating the data and
technical skills, and building toward the consensus necessary, to place fisheries subsidies on the
global trade agenda. The data produced by the monitoring efforts of groups like the OECD made
it possible to analyze the effects of different types of subsidies. Yet, because fisheries subsidies
have been defined predominantly as a public goods issue, rather than a trade issue, agreement
within the WTO and elsewhere has been more difficult to achieve, whether involving formally
binding rules or non-binding mechanisms.
One approach to the impasse on fisheries subsidies could be to reference the principles and
definitions developed by other institutions to define the extent of Member obligations in a WTO
agreement, 157 similar to the incorporation by reference of the Arrangement on Export Credits into
an Annex of the ASCM. 158 The 2007 draft Chairman’s text went in this direction by including a
provision allowing an exception to subsidies disciplines if fisheries-related information was
notified to the relevant body of the FAO, where it would be subject to peer review prior to the
granting of the subsidy. 159 The FAO transparency exercise would pertain only to things like the
quality of the country’s fisheries management system. Review of the subsidy as such would still
take place in the SCM Committee. Most delegations resisted this idea, arguing that the WTO
should be able to conduct surveillance of its own rules, but some delegations saw it as an effective
way to deal with a technically complex issue. 160 The recent EU proposal on subsidies notification
might prove more acceptable. 161
The inability to reach a consensus on the framing of the issue of fossil fuel subsidies
similarly limited the ability to agree on and apply new disciplines. In particular, parties could not
resolve the inherent tensions between viewing such subsidies as a problem of general domestic
economic policy (hence whether they are “inefficient”), a global public goods problem (as a
contributor to climate change), or as a trade issue (involving externalities for trading partners). The
confusion about purposes became reflected in confusion over definitions. Vague definitions, in
turn, hampered notifications because it was not clear what countries must notify. As a result, data
on fossil fuel subsidies remains poor, and there has been inadequate surveillance in all bodies with
a mandate to oversee them. The governance of fossil fuels subsidies thus remains a global
challenge. Nonetheless, for the first time, fossil fuel subsidies are on the global agenda, and
networks of NGOs work with governments and international organizations to improve data. It is
only through such ongoing interaction and data sharing that social consensus eventually may
develop regarding such subsidies, so that new disciplines emerge.
One thread running through the four case studies is that subsidies defined as public goods
problems involve different organizations and dynamics compared to subsidies defined in purely
trade terms. Countries have found it more difficult to reach the social consensus necessary for
comprehensive disciplines on subsidies that pose public goods challenges either within or outside
of the WTO. It has been difficult even to agree on the definition of the subsidies to be notified in
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these areas, which is the first step for obtaining information to enhance social understanding and
facilitate discipline.
The other thread running through the case studies is that disciplines on subsidies begin with
information, and that this public good is under-supplied. The OECD arguably has the largest and
most up-to-date database on subsidies of all international organizations, although it is
predominantly sector specific, and does not use consistent definitions of subsidies across its
databases for industrial subsidies, agricultural subsidies, and environmentally harmful subsidies.
This shortcoming of the OECD is illustrative of the general problem — data are not neutral. The
information available depends on the definitions used, and that reflects consensus on the purpose
for which the information is being gathered and thus what the international organization and its
members are trying to do. Some bodies exist to facilitate learning and promote consensual
understanding; others aim to support negotiations on rules, and ensure credible commitments, or
manage conflict among states; while others aspire to promote domestic policy change. All of these
objectives must be part of an effort to discipline subsidies. All of the international organizations
examined in this article have all of these objectives, but their emphasis varies. Given that a simple
integrated structure of binding rules is not likely soon, we contend that the path to better disciplines
begins with more transparency.
How can we generate more and better information? There are limits to subsidies
notification by governments, not least because trade ministries may not have the information easily
at hand, or be sure of what to report, and where. Reverse notification by trading partners helps, but
no country has an incentive to provide this under-supplied public good. WTO Members are also
sensitive about notifying things on which they are negotiating. During the intense period of Doha
Round agriculture negotiations, even the largest Members were late with notification. One option
is for the WTO Secretariat to become more active in collecting information and making it
available. The inadequate notifications by WTO Members can be partially mitigated by giving the
Secretariat increased scope and resources to act as the “common agent” of Members in assembling
information that was or ought to have been notified, adding data from all other international
organizations and NGOs to create a better picture of the incidence of subsidies in a sector or a
market, with an opportunity for the Member concerned to verify the information. 162
Our story in the end, as Justice Brandeis argued a century ago, is that sunshine helps.
Informal rules may or may not be more “efficient” than codified law, but they can provide
discipline, and thus can be viewed as law. In the case of subsidies, with better information, and
robust surveillance, governments providing them will need to explain themselves to their peers
and to citizens. Such interactive processes of information exchange, knowledge production, and
reason giving can generate new consensual understanding about subsidies disciplines, which is
where all law, whether formal or informal, begins.
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See Mavroidis and Wolfe, above n 10, at 5.

